The Struggle for Global Dominance: Iran, the US Dollar and the Emerging Eurasian Order 

Prof. Heckman argues that the United States entered the conflict with Iran because maintaining control over Iran and the Middle East is essential to preserving American global power, the US dollar system and the broader American-led international order.

According to Prof. Heckman, the American empire depends primarily on the US dollar and the petrodollar. Countries trade internationally in dollars, hold US Treasury securities and rely on the American-controlled financial system. This arrangement historically worked because the dollar and international payment systems were presented as politically neutral.

Prof. Heckman identifies the American response to Russiaโ€™s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 as a turning point. By sanctioning Russia, excluding it from the SWIFT payment system and encouraging European governments to freeze more than $200 billion in Russian assets, the United States allegedly demonstrated that access to the dollar system could be removed for political reasons.

This created an incentive for Russia, China and Iran to establish an alternative Eurasian economic bloc. Prof. Heckman suggests that these countries could trade among themselves, use gold or other alternatives to the dollar and build railways connecting the Eurasian continent. Such an overland trading network would reduce their dependence on maritime routes protected and controlled by American naval power.

Iran and Global Energy Supplies

Prof. Heckman argues that an attack on Iran serves a broader strategy of disrupting energy supplies to China, Europe, Japan and South Korea.

China is described as heavily dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East, including supplies from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Although China has invested extensively in renewable energy, its industrial economy still requires large quantities of energy from multiple sources.

Europe is portrayed as especially vulnerable because it reduced access to Russian energy following the Ukraine war and became more dependent on Middle Eastern suppliers, particularly Qatar. Japan and South Korea are also heavily dependent on imported Middle Eastern energy.

Prof. Heckman argues that, if Middle Eastern and Russian supplies become unavailable or unreliable, these countries will increasingly depend on the United States for energy. This would reinforce American economic power and support continued international demand for the US dollar.

Control of the Western Hemisphere

Prof. Heckman connects the Iran conflict to a wider American strategy of consolidating control over the Western Hemisphere.

He refers to Venezuelaโ€™s large oil reserves and argues that American actions toward Venezuela, Canada, Greenland, Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Nicaragua and Honduras are part of an effort to create what he calls โ€œFortress America.โ€

Under this strategy, the United States would control the energy, minerals, resources and transportation routes of the Western Hemisphere. Foreign powers such as China and Russia would only be permitted to operate in the region under American conditions and possibly after paying an economic or political price.

Prof. Heckman calls this approach the โ€œDonroe Doctrine,โ€ describing it as Donald Trumpโ€™s version of the Monroe Doctrine.

Trumpโ€™s Approach to Iran

Prof. Heckman argues that the United States wants to fight Iran as quickly and cheaply as possible because American society lacks the political will, manufacturing capacity and risk tolerance for a prolonged ground war.

According to this interpretation, Trump expected that airstrikes, leadership decapitation and intimidation would cause Iran to surrender. Prof. Heckman compares this expectation with alleged American actions in Venezuela, suggesting that Trump believed the same approach could be repeated in Iran.

However, Prof. Heckman argues that this approach underestimated Iranโ€™s history, culture, national identity and willingness to resist. He states that underestimating an opponent while being unwilling to commit fully to a war creates a high probability of military failure.

He also portrays Trump as focused heavily on appearances, media impact and rapid victories rather than long-term geopolitical strategy.

The US National Defense Strategy

Although Prof. Heckman acknowledges the argument that Trump may have been misled or acted irrationally, he says that American policy becomes more understandable when viewed through the US National Defense Strategy.

He describes four central elements of this strategy.

1. Secure the Western Hemisphere

The United States seeks to prevent China, Russia and other competitors from establishing strategic influence in North America, Central America, South America, the Caribbean and Greenland.

Prof. Heckman argues that American naval deployments in the Caribbean are intended to demonstrate that the region belongs within the American sphere of influence.

2. Transfer More Responsibility to American Allies

The United States wants NATO members to pay more for their defence and take greater responsibility for confronting Russia in Ukraine.

America would continue providing weapons, financing, intelligence and support, but European countries would carry more of the direct military burden.

A similar model would apply in East Asia, where Japan and South Korea would be expected to play a larger role in containing China.

3. Economically Contain China

Prof. Heckman argues that the United States does not necessarily seek to destroy China but wants to limit its power and force it to accept American dominance.

Chinaโ€™s greatest vulnerability is described as its reliance on maritime trade routes, particularly the Strait of Malacca. A large proportion of Chinese energy imports and international trade passes through this narrow route.

The United States could use its naval power to block or control the Strait of Malacca, thereby restricting Chinaโ€™s access to the Middle East, Africa and the Indian Ocean.

Prof. Heckman also describes the โ€œFirst Island Chain,โ€ consisting of countries and territories including South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Malaysia. This chain limits Chinaโ€™s direct access to the wider Pacific Ocean.

Controlling these routes could allow the United States to impose economic pressure or require China to accept American conditions in order to continue trading.

4. Rebuild American Defence Manufacturing

Prof. Heckman argues that prolonged international instability would allow the United States to expand its defence industry.

He claims that the Pentagon has discussed the possibility of encouraging major manufacturers such as Ford and General Motors to shift some production from civilian vehicles to military equipment and ammunition.

Producing weapons for the government could be more profitable than producing vehicles for consumers because defence contracts are funded by the federal government and can offer stronger margins and predictable demand.

Divide-and-Rule Strategy

Prof. Heckman describes the broader American strategy as a global system of divide and rule.

In Europe, NATO countries would fight or contain Russia.

In East Asia, Japan and South Korea would confront China.

In the Middle East, Iran would confront Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.

The United States would remain behind these regional confrontations, supplying weapons, financing, technology and energy.

Prof. Heckman compares this model with the economic position of the United States during the Second World War. Global conflict could increase international dependence on American production, credit and resources, potentially helping the United States manage or reduce the burden of its approximately $40 trillion national debt.

What Would Constitute an American Defeat?

Prof. Heckman argues that American defeat would not simply mean failing to destroy Iranian infrastructure.

A genuine defeat would occur if the United States were forced to deploy ground troops, Iran survived the invasion, domestic political instability increased inside the United States and American forces were eventually forced to withdraw from the Middle East.

However, Prof. Heckman claims that the United States may not need a conventional military victory. Its broader objective may be to make the world more dependent on American energy, weapons, financing and strategic protection.

Strategic Maritime Choke Points

Prof. Heckman argues that the United States wants to control the worldโ€™s most important maritime and commercial choke points, including:

  • The Strait of Hormuz.

  • The Strait of Malacca.

  • The Panama Canal.

  • Greenland and Arctic routes.

  • The Strait of Gibraltar.

By controlling these locations, the United States could influence the movement of energy, commodities and international trade.

Prof. Heckman also claims that American military agreements with countries such as Indonesia and Morocco provide a legal and strategic foundation for greater American involvement around the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Gibraltar.

Destruction of Energy Infrastructure

Prof. Heckman argues that technological, aerial and drone superiority could be used to damage energy infrastructure around the world.

Reducing global oil production, destroying refineries and disrupting export facilities would lower available energy supplies. Countries facing shortages would then be forced to purchase more energy from the United States or from territories under American influence, such as Venezuela, Canada, Mexico and Greenland.

Under this interpretation, the destruction of competing energy infrastructure is not incidental but part of a wider attempt to create a captive global market for American-controlled resources.

Russiaโ€™s Response

Prof. Heckman argues that Russia cannot accept complete American control over global shipping routes because this would make Russiaโ€™s oil tanker fleet increasingly vulnerable or commercially ineffective.

Russia could respond by building more overland railways across Eurasia, although those routes would remain vulnerable to American air and drone attacks.

Another response would be to militarize and protect Russiaโ€™s so-called shadow tanker fleet. China could potentially help finance this effort because China also depends on the continued movement of Russian and Iranian energy.

This could produce direct confrontations between Russian tankers and American naval forces attempting to seize, block or destroy ships transporting sanctioned oil.

Prof. Heckman considers the seizure of Iranian and Russian-linked tankers to be acts that could eventually lead to direct military confrontation.

Possibility of Wider Global War

Prof. Heckman concludes that the world may already have entered the early stages of a global conflict.

He believes that the confrontation will continue expanding because the United States, Russia, China and Iran have fundamentally different visions of how the international system should operate.

The United States seeks to preserve a dollar-based, maritime and American-controlled world order.

Russia, China and Iran seek a more multipolar system based on Eurasian integration, alternative payment mechanisms, overland infrastructure and reduced dependence on American-controlled institutions.

Prof. Heckman expects Russia to become more directly involved in supporting Iran. He argues that Russian geopolitical and ideological narratives require Moscow to defend Iran against the United States.

In Prof. Heckmanโ€™s view, these competing strategic visions cannot easily be reconciled. The Iran conflict is therefore presented not as an isolated regional war, but as part of a much larger struggle over energy, financial systems, transportation routes, industrial production and control of the future global order.